America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy

This one is of the best book criticizing Bush unilateralism. The two authors were staffers of the Clinton's National Security Council. Yet, their analysis remains as objective as possible. The book central argument is well accepted: the President unilateralism has produced quick victories in Afghanistan and Iraq but has fractured the world system and has exacerbated anti-Americanism. As a result, the U.S. is less secure. The authors make the case that "the fundamental premise of the Bush revolution that America's security rested on an America unbound was profoundly mistaken." The attacks of September 11, 2001, allowed Bush to refashion American foreign policy in a bolder fashion. But, his vision and goals really had not changed. His key assumption is the belief that states, rather than individuals or groups remain the essential force in international affairs. Bush came up with his phrase "Axis of Evil" when referring to Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. He also set his foreign policy in black or white "you are either with us or against us." This refers to countries supposedly supporting terrorism or not. Despite the evidence that al Qaeda is supranational terrorist network with few allegiance to specific State, the Bush doctrine is to fight such terrorist network one State at a time. While the connection between al Qaeda and the Afghanistan Taliban made sense following Bush vision that States do sponsor terrorism; The Taliban was the exception that confirms the rule. Typically, it is not the case, as terrorist networks operate beyond State boundaries. Yet, the conviction derived from victory over the Taliban sent Bush and the U.S. astray on an unbound foreign policy leading to the Iraqi invasion. Regarding Iraq, all the administration assumptions turned out to be incorrect. The U.S. administration three main assumptions where: 1) Saddam Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction posed an imminent threat; 2) Turning Iraq into a viable self-governing state would be easy. The Iraqis would welcome U.S. troops as liberators; and 3) Once weapons were found and postwar normality returned even those countries opposed to the war would want to contribute to Iraq reconstruction. All assumptions were wrong. No weapons of mass destruction have been found. The Iraqi society has collapsed. U.S. soldiers are killed almost daily by Islamic terrorists infiltrating Iraq. And, the U.S. alone is bearing the fiscal and military burden of Iraq reconstruction. Another false assumption driven by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was that the peacekeeping occupation of Iraq would take far fewer soldiers (only 30,000) than the actual war did. This turned out to be a huge mistake. It quickly became clear that the peacekeeping occupation required more soldiers than the war (180,000 for peacekeeping, only 125,000 for the war). The soldiers ranks were quickly shored up; But, at a cost of more than $1 billion per week. We will need that many troops there for at least another year or two. This means $50 to $100 billion alone just for the U.S. troops. This huge cost does not include any Iraq reconstruction cost. Here is the true cost of Bush's unilateralism. Militarily, close to half the U.S. Army is deployed in Iraq, with no exit date in sight. American soldiers are on one-year rotations, and many face the prospect of returning to Iraq within a year of going home. Morale, recruitment and retention are bound to suffer. Our Army is being stretched too thinly on the wrong issue. And, our ability to address more pressing national-security challenges is impaired. The authors make sharp observation regarding the Administration vision. Contrary to popular beliefs, they do not view Bush as a puppet manipulated by a neoconservatives. Instead, they see Bush as an assertive leader effectively imposing his vision. That he does not express it like a Ph.D. in political science is irrelevant. The authors note that the top spots from an executive standpoint are not populated by neoconservatives (Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfovitz, Pentagon adviser Richard Perle), but instead by "assertive nationalists" such as Vice President Dick Cheney, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. But, the neoconservatives have successfully promoted their opinions. Some of the assertive nationalists have become strong advocates of neoconservative policies. This is particularly true for Dick Cheney.